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Abstract 
 
Background: The aim of this study is to examine the flood fatality with a view to identifying 
risks which may inform public policy responses to future flood.  
On July 21st, 2012, Beijing suffered the heaviest rain since 1963. The average rainfall was 215 
mm over a 24 hour period in the central city (301mm in Fangshan District). The rain resulted in a 
flood that caused severe health, social and financial impact. 
Results: This flood caused 79 deaths. Of the 71 deaths for which a specific cause could be 
identified, 5 were rescue team members, 42 were killed by drowning (11 in the car), and the 
others by electricity shock, fallen house, falling items and lightning. The total financial cost was 
estimated to be US$ 1.7 billion. The causations of the deaths inform the risks associated with the 
flood.  
Discussion: This flood had a catastrophic impact on Beijing, mainly due to the intensity of the 
rain (the rain was the heaviest in the modern Beijing history; possibly due to global warming and 
urban heat island effect), the vulnerability of the infrastructure (poor standards of drainage, 
disorganized water management systems and decreased permeability of the earth as a result of the 
city’s rapid development), and the capacity of the response system (mainly dependent on the 
awareness of the citizens, warning systems and the capacity of the emergency rescue). 
Implication: Many risk management measures have been implemented as a result of this flood, 
including water level warning marks, flood safety education and warnings sent to mobile phones, 
a project to move about 74,500 farmers away from the flood-prone areas within 5 years. However, 
further measures targeted at the fundamental issues identified by this analysis are necessary, 
especially those targeting at health issues. These may include better planning, improved drainage 
systems and ecological development to increase permeability etc.. 
Keywords: flood, fatality, risk management, capacity, policy, health-oriented 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Beijing is the capital of China, has a population of 19.6 million1), and ranks 14 in the 
Global Cities Index (ranks the current global influence) in 20122). It consists of 6 central city 
districts and 10 suburb districts. The total area of Beijing is 16,410 square kilometers, and 
woody plant coverage is 54%3). The modern disaster management system in Beijing consists 
of new policies and regulations which were established as a result of major disasters such as 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, earthquakes and flooding along with 
the preparation of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing4).  
On July 21st, 2012, Beijing suffered the heaviest rain since 1963. The average rainfall was 
170mm over a 24 hour period in the whole city; 215 mm in the central city; and 301mm in 
Fangshan District (a suburb in Beijing with a population of about 950 thousand)5),6). The 
highest rainfall was in the Hebei Town of Fangshan District, which was 460mm over a 24 
hour period and made a historical high6). The rainfall during the period of 10:00 am, July 21st 
to 6:00am, July 22nd, 2012 is shown in Figure 1 5). 
The rain resulted in a flood that caused severe health, social and financial impact. The 
health impacts include 79 deaths, 1.9 million people affected, and 57,000 people evacuated. 
In regard to the transportation, Beijing Capital Airport cancelled more than 500 flights, and 
left 80,000 people in the airport; many sections of subways and highways were flooded and 
resulted in severe traffic congestion. The total financial cost was estimated to be US$ 1.7 
billion. 
Exploration the causes of the flood deaths can not only help to identify the potential flood 
risks, but also to find the underlying principles in managing flood risks. The aim of this study 
is to examine the flood fatality with a view to identifying flood risks and its reduction 
measures, which may inform public policy responses to future flood. 
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Fig. 1 Rainfall in Beijing (mm, 10:00am, July 21st to 6:00am, July 22nd, 2012) and 
distribution of deaths (5)and Author).  
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
A case study of the Beijing July 2012 Flood is considered due to its scale and the enormous 
effect of the flood. Flood risks is the “expected losses from given flood events over a 
specified time period”7). Flood risk may consist of magnitude of flood hazards, exposure of 
the human activities to flooding, and the vulnerability of the society at risk according to 
Associated Programme on Flood Management (APFM) as shown in Figure 27). This study 
analyzed the causations of flood fatalities under the APFM framework of flood risks, 
stressing the measures to reduce the risks, including flood hazards reduction, infrastructure 
improvements to reduce exposure, and flood risk management measures to decrease 
vulnerability.  
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Fig. 2 Construct of flood risk and its reduction7). 
 
 
The data and information source of this study includes comprehensive review of publicly 
available information (including government reports, official websites, academic publications 
and newspapers); site visitations; government meeting transcripts (including meetings 
conducted by Beijing Headquarter of Flood and Drought, Beijing Municipal Emergency 
Committee etc.) 
 
 
3. FLOOD FATALITY RESULTS 
 
Of the total 79 deaths, this study identified the specific causes of 71 cases. The number of 
deaths by its causation is shown in Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 3 Classification of deaths by causes 
 
As shown in Fig. 3, most fatalities (52 cases) were due to drowning, which accounts for 
73% of the total deaths with causations identified.  
It is noteworthy that 5 people were killed in conducting rescues. All of them were rescue 
team members, among them, 1 was drowned in his rescue car, 1 was killed by electricity 
shock, 1 was drowned in evacuating citizens, and 2 were killed by overtime work and heart 
failure.  
Of all the cases, only 6 happened within the 5th ring road of Beijing (considered as the city 
area), only 1 died within the second ring road (the very center of the city). The other deaths 
occurred mostly in the suburbs, especially in the mountain areas. The distribution of the flood 
fatalities is shown in Fig. 1.  
Of the 71 identified deaths, 46 were males (all the 5 rescue team members died in the flood 
were male), and 25 were females; 34 were Beijing local residents, 37 were temporary 
residents from places other than Beijing.  
 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
As shown in Fig. 2, the reason for such a large number of flood fatalities may include the 
intensity of the rain (magnitude of flood hazards), exposure of the human activities to 
flooding (improvements in infrastructure may reduce the exposure), and the vulnerability of 
the society at risk (citizens in Beijing at this case, capacity of the response system may reduce 
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the vulnerability).  
 
(1) Flood hazards reduction 
The high intensity and prolonged duration of the rain accounts for the severity of the flood 
hazard, which in turn caused the cases of drowning. The intensity and duration of the rain 
may depend on many factors, the most important of which include global warming and urban 
heat island effect. 
The rain was the heaviest in Beijing in recent 67 years. The intensity and frequency of rains 
have increased all over the world in recent years, possibly due to global warming8), 9). Urban 
heat island effect might be another reason for the rain. The Beijing municipal government 
actually established strict policies on increasing the woody plant coverage; and Beijing 
Municipal Bureau of Landscape and Forestry is a specialized organization established to 
implement related policies and manage the green lands. There are also projects such as 
“Forestation Project in Beijing Plain Area”. However, Beijing is such a big city and the 
population is so large that such effort is not of evident effect. Continuous effort in forestation 
not only in Beijing, but also nationally is desirable.  
Tornado and lightening are phenomena that usually come along with heavy raining. In this 
case, tornado caused two fatalities and three injuries in Tongzhou District when the tornado 
raised the roof of a shed that later hit people on the ground; and lightening caused one fatality. 
Tornado and lightening cannot be reduced, but the risk associated with it may be reduced 
through minimizing exposure and vulnerability. 
 
(2) Infrastructure improvement to reduce human exposure to flood risks 
Infrastructure failure can increase human exposure to flood risks; in this case infrastructure 
failures are due to factors such as poor standards of drainage, disorganized water management 
systems, and decreased permeability of the earth as a result of the city’s rapid development. 
The drainage system in Beijing is designed for a once in 5 years in key areas and once in 
every 1-3 years in most areas. However, the scale of the Beijing July 2012 Flood was the 
largest in recent 61 years; in some areas, the rain level even reached once in 500 years6). The 
imbalance between the flood scale and the drainage system has caused many problems that 
resulted in fatalities. For example, a section about 17.5 kilometers away from Beijing in the 
Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Expressway (one of the main expressways that connect Beijing to 
the cities in its south) was flooded: the flood water was more than 5 meters deep in some 
sections, about 100 cars were submerged, 200 people were stuck in the water, and 3 people 
were drowned. The only deaths occurred in the very center of the city was in a crossing where 
the road goes under the railway. When the drainage system failed, the water came up so 
quickly that the driver in the car was not able to escape. In total, about 30 sections of roads in 
the city had water level over 30 cm, which exposed citizens to the danger.  
After the flood, the incapable drainage system and the ponding at the sink-style overpass 
were identified by the government as infrastructural risks. The corresponding plans to solve 
this problem include: building underground reservoirs to store water during flood peaks; 
reflective warning marks to show flood water levels in the areas that are easily flooded, 
Yellow Mark at 20 cm high for precaution and Red Mark at 27cm high for no driving. 
The other problem is that the water management system is disorganized in some areas of 
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Beijing. One example is the flooding of the airport on July 21st, 2012. On that day, the airport 
was pumping the water to Xiaozhong River which was on its west. However, the river was 
only capable of 170 cubic meters per second, which was equal to the volume the airport was 
pumping. This resulted in two problems: the flood water in the public area of the airport was 
about 30 cm deep even though the pumps were working in its full capacity; the water from 
upstream needed a way to go. Later on, the government had to close the floodgate upstream 
and arranged another 12 pumps to release the water in the airport. The flood of the airport did 
not result in any fatality, but many people were affected upstream, about 500 flights were 
cancelled, and about 80,000 were people left in the airport, which became another disaster: 
passengers were not able to make phone calls as the telecom infrastructure couldn’t handle 
the volume; it was difficult for them to leave the airport as it was raining heavily and so many 
people wanted to leave. 
Decreased permeability of the earth is another factor that accounts for the severity of the 
flood. The paved area increased 15% in the old city area (Beijing East District, Beijing west 
District) and 61% in the planned city area during the period of 1983 to 20056). The high 
percentage of paved area in the city has increased the speed of afflux, and thus the scale of the 
flood.  
Lack of protective railing is another factor that contributed to some fatalities during this 
flood. At least two people could have been saved had the protective railing was in place, 
including a case in a road construction site with very low railing and a case over a small 
bridge without railing.  
Due to concerns of resources availability during flood time, the Beijing Municipal 
Government has also been making stockpiles of levees and sandbags in key infrastructures 
such as the subways and underground shopping centers. 
Mud-rock flow and other similar risks had also caused some fatalities. As shown in Fig. 3, 
one of the fatalities was due to mud-rock flow. The cases of fallen houses were also due to 
mud-rock flow: there were a couple trying to save their goods from the flood water when their 
house was submerged by the mud-rock flow. In response to such risks that normal citizens 
were unable to identify, the government initiated a project to examine all the potential risks in 
the parks, including mud-rock flow, landslide and land collapse; and moved many tourist 
activities away from risk-prone areas. The government also initiated a new project to move 
about 74,500 farmers (35,000 households) away from the hazardous area. This relocation 
project was firstly introduced in 2004, and the government has already moved about 62,600 
people (24,500 households) away from the hazardous area.  
 
(3) Response system to decrease community vulnerability 
The capacity of the city’s response system is a very important factor in decreasing 
vulnerability, and thus determining the flood fatality. This is mainly dependent on the 
awareness of the citizens, warning systems and the capacity of the emergency rescue.  
The local people are always the first to respond to disasters, and the awareness of risks by 
local citizens is one of the fundamental factors that may reduce their vulnerability10), 11). Lack 
of awareness led to fatal results for some people in the Beijing 2012 flood. A young woman 
and her brother lived in a basement in Fengtai District of Beijing. They closed the door of 
their room to prevent water came in when flood water started leaking into the basement. They 
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then realized the problem when they couldn’t open the door due to the pressure from outside. 
The woman was later drowned while her brother survived only by clinging to the roof and 
waited for rescue. There had also been 5 cases that people were killed by electricity shock, 
which could have been prevented had they been aware of the potential risks.  
Weather prediction and flood warning is another important measure to decrease community 
vulnerability. This includes two aspects: the accuracy of the prediction and how the warnings 
were received.  
The accuracy of weather prediction is a challenge in most countries. In this case, the 
estimated rain level was lower than what it was. The emergency plan was activated according 
to the weather warning level, and a low level warning resulted in low or late motivation of 
available resources.  
Nevertheless, Beijing Meteorological Bureau issued 4 warnings on July 21st, Blue (50mm 
within 12 hours) at 9:00am, Yellow (50mm within 6 hours) at 2:00pm, Orange (50mm within 
3 hours) at 6:00pm, and Orange (50mm within 3 hours) at 10:00pm. The warnings were sent 
to government agencies and the public through the media, including radio, TV, websites and 
newspaper etc.. However, many citizens said they did not get the warnings, nor understand 
the meaning of the warnings even though they heard it was going to rain. There was a 
5-year-old boy got drowned in this flood: his parents never watched TV and did not get the 
warning, and he was drowned when his parents tried a late evacuation. Lack of public 
education is one thing to be blamed. The way warnings were sent is another. The best way 
may be to tell the citizens not only what the warning level is, but also what Yellow and 
Orange means and what they are supposed to do under such warnings. In some poorer and 
isolated areas, warnings should also be sent through local government to ensure no one is 
missed.  
Tourist warning and big event warning should also be enhanced. Some of the tourist parks 
were still open despite flood warning. For example, in a tourist resort called Shidu in 
Fangshan District, about 15,000 people were still in this resort on that day despite heavy rain 
forecast. Only when “Blue Warning” were received at 9:00am on July 21st, the local 
government launched the emergency response plan, stopped selling enter tickets and started 
evacuation. This did help in some degree, but about 70 cars and 200 people were still trapped 
by the flood in the evening of July 21st.  
Regarding the response capacity, all the 5 emergency phone numbers, including 110 
(police), 120 (ambulance), 999 (ambulance), 122 (traffic accidents) and 119 (fire and rescue) 
were overwhelmed on that day, and all the available staffs were sent out. The hotline for 
drainage and sewer blockage (96159) managed by Beijing Drainage Group Co., Ltd was also 
overwhelmed. The Beijing government simply wasn’t ready to cope with a flood of such a 
scale. Many of the fatalities could have been prevented had rescue were made in time, 
including the person drowned in his car in the very center of the city: he called the emergency 
numbers and his wife for help when he realized he was trapped his car but no one provided 
professional assistance in time. The overtime work of the rescue teams had resulted in two 
fatalities of rescue team members, while the other 3 rescue team fatalities might have been 
prevented through professional training. Additionally, a centralized hotline may help to 
integrate the resources, and thus enhance efficiency.  
It is worth noticing that some volunteer groups and the army had actively assisted the 
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rescue. Some of the volunteer groups were well organized and fully equipped. One example is 
the Blue Sky Rescue Team, who conducted rescue in alliance with Beijing Red Cross and 
based on the guidance of 119 (fire and rescue) control center. This volunteer group was 
self-sufficient, equipped with rescue professional rescue tools, and was even able to attract 
rescue team members from neighboring provinces (Tianjin and Shandong Provinces) within a 
very short timeframe.  
Beijing municipal government conducted risk analysis in more than 50 areas in the 
preparation of the Beijing 2008 Olympics and made corresponding emergency plans. 
However, the effect and efficacy of these plans need to be examined in real cases or scenarios 
like the Beijing 2012 Flood. “Safe Community” is a concept firstly introduced in 1989 by 
WHO for injury prevention. In Beijing, 22 communities have been recognized as “Safe 
Community”, and the concept is getting recognized by the government and citizens 12). 
Continuous development of safe community may enhance the risk management locally.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many risk management measures have been implemented during the management of this 
flood, including water level warning marks, flood safety education and warnings sent to 
mobile phones, and a project to move about 74,500 farmers away from the flood-prone areas 
within 5 years. However, further measures targeted at the fundamental issues identified by 
this analysis are necessary. Elements that were not dealt with properly in this case include the 
following:  
 
a. On the perspectives of hazards, lack of ecological development and planning is one of the 
reasons for low permeability as well as urban heat island effect, which in turn increased 
the intensity of the rain and the scale of the flood; 
b. Lack of updated comprehensive identification and reduction of potential risks, such as risks 
associated with construction sites and sink style over-passes;  
c. Low infrastructural standard, including standards for drainage system and key 
infrastructures such as the airport and the highways. This might be constrained by the 
current economic development level in China.  
d. Lack of general public education, including knowledge regarding driving behavior, 
potential risks of flood water at home and on the street, as well as other risks associated 
with flood such as electricity, lightening and rock-mud flow; 
e. Lack of education and plans targeted at people working in flood-prone areas; 
f. Lack of emergency response resources and training of the rescue teams; 
g. Lack of a plan for complete closure of endangered sites.  
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